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concert of action liability results
from an express or tacit understanding of a common agreement among
all defendants to carry out a tortious
act. Furthermore, each defendant
must have committed a tort, and at
least one defendant must have
committed a tortious act stemming
from the agreement among the
defendants. However, mere parallel
activity among the defendants, such

as in marketing and product development, the court noted, fails to
prove the agreement required to
maintain a concert of action theory.
The court found that the plaintiffs'
reliance on the defendants' marketing methods and statements to
governmental entities were misplaced. The court found that the
defendants' activities were parallel
and therefore precisely the type of

activities that fail to establish
concert of action liability. Furthermore, the court noted that the
plaintiffs made no showing of an
express or tacit agreement to carry
out a tort, nor had proof surfaced of
any action taken pursuant to such an
agreement. Thus, the court dismissed plaintiffs' claim based on a
concert of action theory.

State law preempts Housing Authority's lease
provision
by Jane Cady
In Doe v.PortlandHousingAuthority, 656
A.2d 1200 (Me. 1995), the Supreme Court of Maine
denied a request to invalidate a provision contained
within a Portland Housing Authority ("PHA") lease. The
lease provision banned the possession of all firearms on
leased premises. The court held that Maine law preempted the PHA regulation because the state law
overrode the PHA lease clause. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit.
25, § 2011 (West 1994). Because of the preemption, the
court found it unnecessary to explore any of the constitutional issues raised by the appellants.
The appellants, Jane and John Doe, were both
skilled and licensed gun users who possessed firearms in
their PHA residence. They contended the PHA lease
violated several of their constitutional rights, including
the right to bear arms, the right to defend life and liberty,
and equal protection of the laws. The trial court held the
lease provision did not violate these constitutional
guarantees. Additionally, the trial court found state law
did not preempt the PHA ban on firearms. Therefore, the
court upheld the lease provision and denied the Does'
request.

PHA qualifies as a political subdivision
The Supreme Court of Maine decided if the
PHA qualified as a political subdivision within the
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meaning of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 25, § 2011 (West
1994), it was not necessary to examine the constitutional
issues raised by the appellants. State law preempts
regulations of its constituents' political units if there is
an expressed intent to do so. Thus, if PHA is a political
subdivision, title 25, section 2011 of the Maine Code
preempts its firearm regulation.
The PHA contended there is no preemption
because only orders, ordinances, rules, and regulations
of political subdivisions are affected. The PHA argued it
is not a political subdivision because it is not specifically
enumerated in the statute. Secondly, the purpose of title
25, section 2011 of the Maine Code is to make firearm
regulations uniform so that hunters traveling through
Maine will not be subjected to different regulations
when they cross town lines. Therefore, the PHA claimed
that the legislature had no intent to preempt the PHA
lease.
The statute is not clear on its face whether the
PHA is a political subdivision. The PHA is neither
defined within the statute nor specifically named as one
of the enumerated examples. However, the statute makes
it clear that the enumerated agencies are only examples
and the list is nonexclusive. Therefore, the Maine
Supreme Court turned to the legislative history to assist
in the interpretation of the statute.
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Legislative history indicative of uniformity
of regulations
The legislative history of title 25, section 2011
of the Maine Code supports the conclusion that the
legislature intended to preempt the regulation of
firearms by the PHA. The principle thrust of the
legislation is to make Maine's firearm laws uniform for
all Maine citizens. Title 25, section 2011 of the Maine
Code was passed on the heels of a Maine constitutional
amendment changing Maine's constitutional right to
bear arms from a collective to an individual right. The
statute was enacted to reinforce the amendment and
ensure uniformity in the regulation of guns for all Maine
citizens. Therefore, the legislative history is consistent
with title 25, section 2011 of the Maine Code's expressed intent to occupy and preempt the entire field of
legislation concerning the regulation of firearms.
Although two exceptions to title 25, section
2011 of the Maine Code exist, the PHA does not qualify
for either one. The first upholds municipal ordinances if
they conform exactly with state law or only concern the

discharge of firearms. The second permits law enforcement agencies to regulate the type or use of firearms
issued to its employees. Furthermore, there is no
indication that the PHA lease provision should be
exempted. The legislature even rejected the possibility
of exempting municipalities of over 15,000 from the
ordinance.
The PHA also claimed that by enacting the
United States Housing Act, Congress intended to
override any preemption under state law. Under the
Housing Act, federal law gives housing authorities
management responsibilities over their projects. The
Maine Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument
because title 25, section 2011 of the Maine Code does
not conflict with federal law.
Therefore, the PHA lease provision is contrary
to the legislature's intent to ensure the equal treatment of
all Maine citizens concerning firearm regulations.
Because the PHA had broad powers consistent with its
mission of carrying out public and essential functions, it
qualified as a political subdivision. Therefore, the court
held state law preempted the PHA lease provision and
was unenforceable.

Credit reports updated in 30 days meet reasonable
standard
by Melissa Jerves
In Elliott v. TRW, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 960 (N.D.
Tex. 1995), the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas held that a credit reporting
agency acted reasonably under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. §1681, when it deleted an
outstanding judgment from a credit report within 24
days of receiving notice that the judgment had been
paid.
On May 13, 1988, a $200 judgment was
entered against the plaintiff, Gary Elliott ("Elliott"), for
failure to pay rent. Elliott satisfied the judgment on June
20, 199 1, and immediately gave TRW, Inc. ("TRW"), a
credit reporting agency, a copy of the release of judgment so that TRW could update his credit report. TRW
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requested that Elliott obtain a statement verifying his
payment because the date on the release of judgment
was unclear. On July 8, 1991, Elliott provided TRW
with a letter confirming that he had paid the judgment.
TRW claimed that it requested that the judgment be
deleted from Elliott's credit report on July 31, 1991; on
August 1, 1991, the report was updated. Elliott alleged
that TRW acted unreasonably in the length of time it
took TRW to delete the judgment from his credit report
and that as a result, three creditors denied him credit. He
also claimed that there was a genuine issue of fact for
trial regarding the accuracy of the information on his
credit report about the judgment after June 20, 1991.
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